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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
TRUSTEES, INC., and JEAN C. CRANMER, THOMAS D. BRADEN, and
EDWARD G. KNOWLES,
Defendants-Respondents.

--

Case No.

87 62

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Preliminary Statement
This appeal is from a declaratory judgment in favor
of the defendants and against the plaintiff entered in the
District Court, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County,
Utah on October 24, 1957 (R. 88-89) upon written findings
of fact and conclusions of law (R. 81-87).
The action was commenced September 28, 1955 by the
filing of the complaint with the clerk of the District Court,
Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, Utah (R.1-16).
The plaintiff-appellant is Union Pacific Railroad
Company, a Utah railroad corporation. The defendantsrespondents are Trustees, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
and Jean C. Cranmer, Thomas D. Braden and Edward G.
Knowles, individuals, who were at all times pertinent to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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this case owners of shares of stock of Union Pacific Railroad Company.
The complaint set forth a cause of action under and
pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment statutes of the
State of Utah, Section 78-33-1 et seq.; Utah Code Anno.,
1953 (R. 1-16). The action was commenced to clarify the
corporate power of the appellant to grant and contribute
a sum to Union Pacific Railroad F'oundation and to make
co~t~~butions and donations for the public welfare, or for
charitable, scientific, religious or educational purposes.
The question at issue arose by reason of claims and
demands of the respondents denying such power (R. 24,
43-46). The complaint asserted that such donations or
contributions of corporate.funds were within the implied
powers of the appellant corporation, and lawful and
proper in every respect, and in addition were specifically
authorized under Section 16-2-14(8) Utah Code Anno.
(1955 Pk. Supp.) (R. 4). The answer denied that the
donation or contribution of corporate funds described in
the complaint was within the implied or statutory powers
of the appellant corporation and claimed such action to
be ultra vires and void (R. 19).
The Court below based its determination that the
defendants-respondents were entitled to the declaratory
judgment herein appealed from, upon the following conclusions of law (R. 85-87):
1. The Board of Directors of the appellant in
making a contribution to Union Pacific Railroad
Foundation acted beyond the express or implied
powers of the corporation, and the making of contributions for charitable, scientific, religious or educa tiona! purposes would similarly be beyond the
express or implied powers of the corporation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
2. The statutory grant of corporate power to
engage in philanthropy embodied in Section 16-2-14
(8) Utah Code Anno. (1955 Pk. Supp.) does not
apply to the appellant so as to authorize the contribution to Union Pacific Railroad Foundation or
similar charitable contributions.
3. The addition of the statutory power to donate
to the powers of the appellant corporation would
constitute a fundamental change in the shareholders'
contracts embodied in the appellant's Articles of
Association.
4. The application to the appellant of the statutory power to donate would constitute an impairment
of the obligation of the shareholders' contracts in
violation of the contracts clauses of both the Federal
Constitution and the Constitution of Utah.
5. The application to the appellant of the statutory power to donate would constitute a violation of
the due process clauses of both the Federal Constitution and the Constitution of Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The appellant was incorporated on July 1, 1897,
under an Act providing for the formation of railroad
corporations, approved January 22, 1897 as supplemented and amended (R. 82). It was formed for the
purpose of operating and maintaining a railroad, and was
vested with the powers necessary for such purpose, as
well as all the rights, privileges and franchises of railroad corporations organized under the laws of the State
of Utah (R. 26).
The appellant's business is the transportation of
freight and passengers by rail and activities incident
thereto. The appellant operates a:Pproximately 10,000
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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miles of road, running through thirteen states, employs
about 50,000 persons and its net income before Federal
Income Taxes for the year 1955 was $119,527,256 (R. 82).
On May 13, 1955, members of the Board of Directors
of the appellant corporation organized the Union Pacific
Railroad Foundation as a non-profit corporation under
Section 16-6-1 et seq., Utah Code Anno., 1953 (R. 83).
The Foundation was organized for the objects and purposes of exclusively engaging in, assisting, contributing
to the support of, creating and maintaining exclusive]y
charitable, educational and scientific activities, projects,
institutions, organizations and funds of any and every
kind. (Ibid.) Only individuals who are directors of
the appellant corporation (or a subsidiary or affiliate) are
eligible to become members of the Foundation (R. 34).
In the event that any member should cease to be a director his membership in the Foundation ceases forthwith
(R. 35). The management of the affairs of the Foundation is vested in a Board of Trustees of whom a majority
must at all times be members of the Foundation (R. 36).
The Foundation was organized by the appellant as a
medium through which its philanthropic activities would
be conducted (R. 83), and it is at all times subject to the
control of those directors of the appellant who have been
elected to the Board of Trustees by their fellow directors
(R. 64). This right in the membership to elect the Board
of Trustees further subjects the Foundation to the control of the appellant, who may exercise additional control through its power to disburse funds to the Foundation (R. 64-65).
The advantages, of giving through a company-sponsored foundation rather than directly, sought by the
Board of Directors of the appellant corporation in
establishing the Union Pacific Railroad Foundation as
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a medium for its philanthropy, included improved administration of a program of giving and the permitted
reasonable accumulation of funds in years of high profit
which might be drawn upon in years of low profit, thus
levelling out fluctuation in giving and facilitating a
systematic and deliberate planning of grants (R. 83,
Sinclair Dep. p. 29).
On May 26, 1955, the appellant's Directors adopted
a resolution authorizing a contribution of $5,000 to the
Union Pacific Railroad Foundation (R. 83). On June 30,
1955, the Foundation's Board of Trustees adopted a
resolution authorizing a contribution of $4,000 to Brigham Young University, to be applied one-half to the
University's building program and one-half to current
income needs (R. 83). Brigham Young University is a
Utah non-profit corporation, control of which is vested
in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. The
University is devoted exclusively to educational and
religious purposes ( R. 24).
The history of the eleemosynary activities of the
appellant corporation covers a span of more than fifty
years. Mr. E. Roland Harriman, Chairman of the appellant's Board of Directors and Chairman of the American
National Red Cross under appointment by the President
of the United States, testified at the trial that charitable
giving by the appellant can be traced to as early as 1906
(R. 56). At the time of the San Francisco earthquake,
the appellant shipped into the stricken area some 1,600
carloads of food and building materials free of charge.
In addition to turning over stores and supplies to relief
authorities, the appellant donated the cash sum of
$200,000 for general relief work and moved some 224,000
passengers out of the stricken area free of charge (Ibid.).
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There has been a marked upward trend in corporate
philanthropy in the United States since 1940* (Watson·
Dep. p. 10). In 1940, donations for charitable purposes
by corporations were in the neighborhood of $40 million.
Since that year corporate giving has continued to rise,
the Statistics of Income published by the Federal Government indicating aggregate contributions for the year
1951 to be $341 million and estimates of the current total
to be above $500 million annually (Ibid.). On the average,
corporations throughout the United States donate
between .8 and .9 of 1% of their net income before taxes
to charity (Id. at p. 14).
This growth in corporate donations since 1940 was
occasioned in the first instance by the needs of charities
during World War II and thereafter by the continued
expansion of the activities and needs of health and welfare organizations (R. 55). At the trial ~fr. Harriman testified that currently some 30 to 40 percent of the income
of the National Red Cross and similar organizations as
well as the Community Chest are derived from corporations (Ibid.). In the case of the National Red Cross, the
remaining percentage of the $85 million received during
the year 1955 came from individuals, employee groups,
foundations, women's groups, church groups and the like
(Sinclair Dep. p. 23). The recipients of corporate philanthropy include educational institutions, primarily
colleges and universities, community institutions, such
• For a general discussion of the background, le!!al aspects
and growth of corporate giving in the United States, see:
Andrews. Corporat?·on G1'm'nq, pp. 229-244 (RnsselJ Sag-e Foundation, l!J;)2) : Bell, Corpm·at?'on Support of Educatinn. 38
ABAJ l 19 (1952) ; Bleicken, Corporate Contrt:buNons to Char?·ties, 38 ABAJ 999 (1952) ; and de Capriles ann Garrett Corporate Support to Education, 38 ABAJ 209 (1952).
'
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as united funds and community chests, and local institutions, such as hospitals, cultural and civic groups (Watson Dep. pp. 18-19; See also, Ex. 3 to Sinclair Dep. p.
7).
The growth in recent years of corporate aid to education has been in response to the needs occasioned by the
financial crisis facing private higher education in the
United States (Lincoln Dep., p. 7; E~. 4 to Sinclair Dep.,
pp. 3-6). The critical needs of American colleges and
universities are due to several factors, including the
impact of taxation upon funds of individuals available
for donations and endowments, continued increases in
student enrollment, disparity between tuition and cost
per student, decline of relative importance of endowment
income and continued increases in operating expenses and
capital expenditures (Ex. 4 to Sinclair Dep., pp. 3-6 and
Ex. 1 to Lincoln Dep., pp. 4-7 ; see also, Mullendore Dep.,
p. 5). Corporate giving is one of the principal sources
of adequate support available to private higher education (Ex. 1 to Lincoln Dep., pp. 8-11). Large private
gifts and contributions to endowment have become,
because of high taxBs, almost non-existent and the same
is true of the private foundation. Funds from alumni and
friends are pitifully inadequate and financial support
from government, the remaining source, constitutes a
threat to the independence of the beneficiary institutions
(Ibid.).
The purpose of the appellant corporation in organizing the Union Pacific Railroad Foundation as a medium
through which its philanthropic activities would be conducted (R. 83) was to initiate a program under which
the corporation, through its Board of Directors in the
exercise of their collective prudent business judgment,
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would (i) assume its reasonable share of the cost of preserving a favorable economic and social environment,
within the framework of the free enterprise system, and
in which the corporation may continue to prosper to its
benefit and the ultimate benefit of its shareholders and,
(ii) assume its reasonable and rightful share of the social
responsibilities of both individual and corporate citizens
of the community to preserve and maintain our economic
and social order (R. 60-61, Mullendore Dep., pp. 6-8 and
Sinclair Dep., pp. 8-10).
At the trial Mr. Harriman expressed his opinion as
Chairman of the Board of the appellant, as to the reasonable distribution of corporate funds for the above purposes in the following language:
Well, I think it is good business to do so; in
the long run, beneficial to our stockholders. The
very continuance of our public service corporation
depends upon the growth of our communities that
we serve, and the healthy environment in which
those communities operate.
If the communities were not there, we certainly
would not be able to serve them, and in a like manner, if they are not in a good condition, mentally,
morally and physically, they would not be as good
customers. We really believe the existence of this
atmosphere of healthy environment I speak of, is
as much of a must in the maintenance of it by our
company as the maintenance of our :>hysical property, using reasonable judgment throughout.
Secondly, we think we can increase t:nd maintain the goodwill in those communities. As I said,
I think that the public has come to expect thr...t we
will support worthwhile local and national causes,
and, in effect, we agree with this viewpoint
(R. 60-61).
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Another Director of the appellant corporation, John
S. Sinclair• testified as follows with respect to the basis
for his belief that the corporation should expand its support of educational and welfare institutions:
Now, as we know, each individual has certain responsibilities toward his fellowmen, some
imposed by law, others imposed by his own conscience or by the influence of public or community
opinion. A corporation is not much different in
these respects. . .. it is given a corporate personality by law and is treated as a legal entity,
and the general public thinks of it as something
separate and apart from its shareholders and its
employees and its management, which mer.ns that
the corporation has a good name, or a bad or
uncertain name in the public eye or the community
estimation, it incurs either goodwill or illwill in
communities where it operates and which it serves.
The studies that we have issued, which have
been referred to, indicate that the public has come
to expect that corporations shall act like responsible human members of society; that is, that they
will contribute to worthy causes to strengthen and
stabilize our economic and social structure.
Now, this does not mean that the people expect
corporations to dissipate the shareholders' assets
by unwise or foolish largesse. Such activity, of
• Mr. Sinclair is President of the National Industrial Conference Board, a research and educational institution for the
study of the economic and administrative problems of American
business. It assembles and disseminates to industry, labor, g-overnment, educators and the public facts on business organi'Zation
and operation and on the national economy (Ex. 6 to Watson
Dep.). The National Industrial Conference Board numbers
amon~ its membership over 3,000 of the foremost American corporations and educational and other institutions, including
Anaconda Copper Mining Company, Kennecott Copper Corporation the Utah Construction Company, Utah Power and Light
Comp~ny and the Utah State Agricultural College (ld., See,
list following p. 107).
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course, would bring prompt intervention by the
courts at the instance of complaining shareholders. What I really mean is that we have come
to expect corporations to behave in the field of
social consciousness as individuals would behave
-that is, with a prudent eye to its financial capacity and selectivity as to the objects of its generosity. I do not mean by this that corporations
should give only where a measurable or direct
tangible benefit is purchased with the so-called
donation. The community does not expect that individuals shall give on any such basis, and corporations should not be so limited.
In my view, it is not good business to disappoint
the public expectation I have described. Corporate
donations create good will in the community. In
many instances, assistance to private institutions
will help reduce the burden on public institutions,
and thus on the public purse and the extent of
taxation for that purpose.
For example, I have no doubt that support for
the Boy Scouts will help in a given community to
reduce juvenile delinquency, and help to the Red
Cross assists in the performance of many quasipublic functions which otherwise would have to be
assumed by government. Assistance to private
educational institutions of higher learning will
help to create a pool of highly-trained and educated persons from which the future management
of business corporations must be chosen.
I would not, however, want to base my theory
of corporate support of education solely on the
direct benefits to corporations from a pool of
trained manpower. In my view, assistance to education will result in national benefits to our society
as a whole-benefits of an ethical, moral, and
spiritual nature-and that is why I favor such
support.
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Furthermore, I have also believed that if our
young people are educated, they will freely choose
our system of competitive enterprise over any
competing system. The hope. of America lies in
knowledge, not in ignorance (Sinclair Dep., pp.
8-10).
William C. Mullendore, Chairman of the Board of
Southern California Edison Corporation, testified as a
Director of the appellant corporation with respect to the
obligation of corporations to support educational and
charitable institutions, and benefits accruing to them from
such support, as follows:
The basis of our policy of making contributions
in aid of the work and in support of educational
and charitable institutions is, of course, first of all,
as a citizen of the community dependent upon the
goodwill of the customers. In considering the
goodwill as an important part of our assets, we
find a real need for playing our part in the community. That relates particularly to charitable
contributions.
In educational matters, we believe that one of
the primary duties of the Board of Directors and
management of a corporation is to preserve the
institution. It is just as much our duty to help
preserve the basic principles upon which our public
service enterprise depends for its continued existence within the framework of a free enterprise
system, as it is to preserve the physical equipment
against the physical elements, normal wear and
tear and depreciation.
We recognize that in a free society the rights
of the citizen are dependent upon the discharge of
his obligations, and that if the free citizens fail
to help preserve their free institutions through the
education and training and passing on of our tradiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tions of a free country to the youth, those institutions would be undermined by the inadequacy and
lack of understanding and ignorance of the citizens.
It is therefore on that general line of reasoning
that we feel that it is just as much the obligation
of the corporate management to use some of its
resources in helping to educate the youth of a
country and of our community in the principles
and traditions of our free institutions, as it is to
use our resources in the construction and maintenance of our physical equipment.
Coincidentally, we have included in our regular
0perating expenses the provision for those donations, as necessarily included a much larger, of
course, budget for maintenance of our physical
equipment. In that very real sense we believe that
it is protecting the interest of the stockholder in
both the principal of his investment and his earnings through dividends (Mullendore Dep., pp. 6-8).
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I. The donation in question constitutes a proper
exercise of a valid statutory corporate power embodied
in Section 16-2-14(8) Utah Code Anno.
a. The statutory power to make donations applies to
pre-existing corporations.
b. The statutory power to make donations does not
constitute a fundamental alteration of the shareholders' contract embodied in appellants' corporate charter.
c. Even if the statutory addition of a corporate power
to make donations were a fundamental change in
the sharel1olders' contract, such change would not
violate the Constitutional prohibitions against
impairment of contracts.
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(2) Even if Utah followed the "immutable contract" theory the statute authorizing donations is valid under the state's reserved power
over corporate charters or under the state's
police power.
d. The statutory addition of a power to make donations does not infringe the due process requirements of the Utah and Federal Constitutions.

II. The donation in question constitutes a proper
exercise of an implied power possessed by Utah corporations without regard to Section 16-2-14(8) Utah Code
Anno.
ARGUMENT

I
The contribution represents a valid exercise by
the appellant corporation of a statutory power
granted to it by Section 16-2-14 ( 8) Utah Code Anno.
(a) The statutory power to donate is applicable to
and was exercised by the appellant, a pre-existing corporation.

On May 10, 1955 Utah joined the ranks of thirty-eight
sister states/ the District of Columbia and the Territory
1 States with laws expressly granting to corporations the
power to engage in philanthropy are the following: Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Citations to the
statutes in the foregoing states, as well as the District of Columbia and the Territory of Hawaii, are set forth in Appendix A.
Nine States have no permissive legis1ation with respect to power
to donate and are as follows: Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Iowa,
Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and
Wyoming.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Hawaii in expre,ssly granting to corporations of the
State, by act of the Legislature, the power to engage in
philanthropy. The statutory power embodied in Section
16-2-14(8) Utah Code Anno., reads as follows:
The corporation in its name shall have power

•

•

(8) To make donations for the public welfare
or for charitable, scientific, religious or educational purposes. Provided, however, that nothing
in this section shall be construed as directly or
indirectly affecting the restrictions on corporate
contributions imposed by section 20-14-21, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
In empowering Utah business corporations to make
charitable donations, the Legislature followed the model
statute recommended by the Committee on Business Corporations of the American Bar Association. 2 The recommendation suggested that the donative power be added
to the section of the corporation law enumerating the
general powers of corporations and was specific in its
grant of a power broad in its terms and without limitation as to amount. The Committee saw "no logical reason
for prescribing a statutory yardstick for measuring the
amount that can be donated.' ' 3 This recommendation
of a power without statutory limitations or restrictions
on the quantum of the donation is incorporated in the
statutes of Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon and Wisconsin. 4
2
See, Memorandum, dated September 1, 1950, from the Committee on Business Corporations of the Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association,
set forth in Appendix B.
8 Ibid.
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It should be clearly understood that the absence of
any limitation in the Utah statute as to the amount of
donations permitted does not furnish any proper ground
for objection to the statute. The donative power, like
all other corporate powers, must be exercised by the
directors in accordance with sound business judgment.
An improper exercise of this power would be subject to
judicial restraint and personal liability as in the case of
all improper actions by the board of directors. The idea
that a statutory statement of the power of Utah corporations to ~make donations constitutes a license in the board
of directors to give away all the assets of the corporation
is obviously without merit. Each and every exercise of
the donative power is subject to the rule of "reasonable
business judgment"5 which may be enforced either by
a shareholder suit or by the removal of directors by vote
of the shareholders at their annual meeting.
In enacting the donative power provision, the Utah
legislature has declared the public policy of the state to
favor donations by Utah corporations for eleemosynary
purposes. This declaration of policy was expressly noted
at the trial by Attorney General Callister, when he
stated:
... it is our position the statute is constitutional, and the Legislature by enacting Chapter
22, Laws of '55, has declared the policy of the
State of Utah in favor of permitting corporations
to make charitable donations ... (R. 50)
The appellant is a Utah railroad corporation and as
such has been vested by the Legislature with all of the
powers of Utah business corporations including the
recently-enacted power to donate.
5 See, Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 7, Sec. 3453
(Perm. Ed.).
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As stated above, the appellant was incorporated on
July 1, 1897 under an Act providing for the formation
of railroad corporations approved January 22, 1897, as
supplemented and amended. 6 Under this Act, railroad
companies were granted certain express powers and were
granted additional powers as follows:
Such corporations shall in addition to the foregoing powers be vested with and be entitled to
exercise and enjoy all powers, rights, privileges
and franchises which at the time of the sale
belonged to or were vested in the corporation or
corporations last owning the property sold, as well
as all the rights, privileges and franchises of railroad corporations organized under the laws of this
State •.. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the time of the appellant's organization, the Utah
Constitution, which became operative on January 4,
18967 contained the reserved power provision found in
Article XII, Section 1, whereby ''All laws relating to
corporations may be altered, amended or repealed by the
Legislature . . . ". 8 Accordingly, the Act under which
the appellant was organized gTanted to it all the rights,
privileges and franchises of Utah railroad corporations
and, by reason of its reserved power, the state retained
the right to alter, amend or repeal the powers so granted
to it.
In 1901, the statutes relating to Utah railroad corporations were revised and codified to provide that all
such corporations, regardless of when organized, should
possess all of the powers and privileges conferred by the
6

L. 1897, Ch. 1, p. 13.
See, 1 Utah Code Anno., 1953, pp. 309, 311.
s I d. at p. 259.
7
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newly enacted railroad law. 9 The present counterpart
of such provision states that :10
Railroad corporations heretofore organized
and now existing or hereafter organized under the
laws of this state shall be subject to all the duties
imposed and shall have and possess all the powers
and privileges conferred by this title, as well as tbe
powers and privileges conferred by the laws under
which said corporations were organized or which
are contained in their articles of incorporation and
are not inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of this state. (Emphasis supplied.)
In 1907, by amendment to the railroad law, every
Utah railroad corporation, regardless of when organized,
was granted all the powers of corporations organized
for pecuniary profit. 11 The present counterpart of such
grant provides that :12
Every railroad corporation organized under
the laws of this state shall, except as otherwise
provided in this title and subject to the limitations
and requirements hereof, have all the rights, privileges and powers, and be subject to all the duties
and obligations, of corporations organized for
pecuniary profit . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing provisions of the Utah railroad law
were of course in force in 1945 when the appellant's
corporate life was extended by amendment to its articles
of association13 and they thus form a part of the contract
9

L. 1901, Ch. 26, Sec. 8, p. 24.
Section 56-1-1, Utah Code Anno., 1953.
11 C. L. 1907, Sees. 433 and 434.
12 Section 56-1-5, Utah Code Anno., 1953.
13 See, Sixth Amendment to appellant's Article of Association, R. following p. 26.
10
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between the appellant and its stockholders embodied in
such articles. 14
In enacting the recent grant of power to donate, the
Utah Legislature clearly intended, as a matter of statutory construction, that the power should apply to corporations organized prior to the effective date of the statute
as .well as those organized thereafter. . This is readily
demonstrated from the unambiguous language of the
applicable statutory provisions.
The donative power was enacted by the U tab Legislature as paragraph (8) to Section 16-2-14, Utah Code
Anno. wherein the powers of corporations for pecuniary
profit are enumerated. Section 16-2-14 begins with the
phrase ''The corporation under its name shall have
power:" (emphasis supplied) and then proceeds to specify the powers granted. The phrase ''The corporation''
as used in such Section means all corporations for pecuniary profit regardless of when incorporated, for Section
16-2-2, Utah Code Anno., 1953, reads as follows:
Unless otherwise provided in any title of these
statutes, the provisions of this chapter shall
apply to all private corporations organized under
the laws of this state. (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be clearly understood that the question which
is the subject of this section of the brief is merely one
of statutory construction, i. e., putting to one side questions of Constitutional significance, did the Legislature
intend to exercise the state's reserYed power so as to
make available to pre-existing corporations the statutory power to donate. That it has chosen to do so is
beyond question. It is of course for this Court and not
for the Legislature to resolve the question of whether,
14
See, Fowler, et al. v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co.
et aZ., 99 Utah 267 (1940), cert. denied 313 U. S. 564 (1941).
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as so applied, the statute is violative of any of the
respondents' Federal and State Constitutional rights.
These questions are discussed in following sections of
the brief.
. In its :findings of fact, the court below held that it did
not appear from the language of the donative power
amendment that the Legislature intended the enactment
to have retrospective application. 15 If by "retrospective
application" the court meant application to a preexisting corporation, the :finding is clearly erroneous and
is contrary to the express language of the Legislature as
demonstrated hereinabove. Moreover if by '' retrospective application" the court below meant application of
the donative power to validate a contribution made prior
to. the effective date thereof, the holding is equally erroneous. The facts of this case do not call for any such
"retrospective application" since the donation by the
appellant corporation was indisputably made after the
effective date of the statutory power to donate. The
effective date of the legislation in question was May 10,
1955.16 The Union Pacific Railroad Foundation, the recipient of the donation, was organized three days later, i.e.,
on May 13, 1955, as a Utah non-profit corporation. 17 The
resolution of the appellant's Board of Directors, granting
and contributing the sum in question to the Union Pacific
Railroad Foundation, was adopted sixteen days after the
effective date of the legislation, i.e., on May 26, 1955. 18
In McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers' Ret. Board,
. et al., 111 Utah 251 (1947), this Court passed on the question of whether a teacher who had retired and had ceased
15

R. 85.
L. 1955, Ch. 22, p. 39.
17
R. 83.
18
Ibid.
16
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to be a member of the State Teachers' Retirement System
in 1943, a time when teachers' retirement benefits were
based on years of service in the public schools only,
was entitled to benefit from a 1945 amendment to the
Teachers' Retirement Act which purported to extend the
benefits of the retirement system to certain non-public
school teachers. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that she was entitled to such extended benefits
and held that the 1945 amendment should not be so construed as to operate retrospectively "to persons who had
retired and who were no longer members of the public
school system when the amendment became effective"
(Id. at p. 254). The decision might conceivably have
some bearing on the question of whether the statutory
power operates to validate retrospectively a corporate
donation made prior to the effective date of the legislation. However, as noted above, such question is not presented in the case at bar.
The court below made reference in its findings to the
fact that the evidence in tL.e case did not show that any
shareholders' action had been taken authorizing the donation by the appellant to the Union Pacific Railroad Founda tion. 19 There was in fact no such action by shareholders and none was required since the Corporation
Code specifically provides that the ''corporate powers
of the corporation shall be exercised by the Board of
Directors". 20 The phrase "corporate powers" includes
those set forth in the statutory grant of general powers
(among which is the power to donate), as well as powers
implied at common law and on which appellant also
relies to sustain its power to make the contribution at bar.
As noted in the Statement of Facts, this action arose
out of a contribution made by the appellant to the Union
10

R. 85.
Section 16-2-21, Utah Code Anno., 1953.
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Pacific Railroad Foundation, a charitable foundation
organized and sponsored by the appellant as a mediam
through which its program of giving might be conducted.
The Foundation in turn made a contribution of funds
received from the appellant to Brigham Young U niversity. The Foundation was organized as a Utah nonprofit corporation, and is limited under its affidavit of
organization to:
. . . the objects and purposes of exclusively
engaging in, assisting and contributing to the support of exclusively charitable, educational and
scientific activities and projects and contributing
to the support of and the creation and maintenance
of exclusively charitable, educational and scientific
institutions, organizations and funds of any and
every kind . . . ( R. 31)
It is hardly subject to question that a contribution to
a donee whose objects and purposes are thus limited to
eleemosynary activities constitutes the exercise of the
statutory power to engage in philanthropy.
(b) The application to the appellant corporation of
the statutory power to donate does not constitute a fundamental change in the shareholders' contracts embodied
in the appellant's charter. Thus, no Constitutional objections on the theory of impairment of contract can be
raised by the respondents.

The charter of a corporation is generally regarded
as a tri-partite contract: first, a contract between the
state and the corporation, second, between the corporation and its shareholders, and third, between the shareholders inter se. 21 The plural nature of the contracts
embodied in the charter of Utah corporations was recognized by this Court fifty years ago and formed the basis
21 See, Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations Vol. 7, Sec. 3657
(Perm. Ed.).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
for its holding in Garey v. Mining Co.,22 hereinafter discussed.
In Dartmouth College v. W oodward23 the United
States Supreme Court held that a corporate charter was
a contract and as such entitled to protection under the
provision of the Federal Constitution prohibiting any
state from enacting a law impairing the obligation of a
contract.24 After the Dartmouth College case, it was
recognized that a state legislature might not, without
the consent of the corporation, alter or amend the charter,
unless it specifically reserved the right to do so in its
grant to the corporation. The general practice quickly
arose, pursuant to Mr. Justice Story's suggestion in the
Dartmouth College concurring opinion, on the part of the
several states to reserve to the State, in the grant of
corporate charters, the right to alter, amend or repeal
the laws governing corporations. As has been noted
previously, the Utah Constitution contained such
reserved power at the time of the organization of the
appellant corporation.
At the time of the Dartmouth College decision, and
the passage of the legislation that case initiated, the
plural contractual nature of the corporate charter had
not been clearly developed in the case law. The question
has since been raised as to whether the typical reserved
power clause was enacted merely to avoid the rule of
the Dartmouth College case, i. e., to enable the State to
do what that case prohibited, to wit, effect a fundamental
change which in the absence of the reserved power would
constitute an impairment of the contract between the
state and the corporation, or whether, on the other hand,
22

32 Utah 497, 505 (1907).
4 Wheat. 518 (U. S., 1819).
U. S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 10, Cl. 1; See also, Utah Const.,
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the reserved power should be construed broadly so as
to . p.ermit what ~ould. otb.erwise constitute 'impairment
of the corporation-shareholder contracts ~nd the contracts between the sh~reholders inter se. Under the
so-called Massachusetts rule, the latter interpretation prevails.25 However, under the theory of immutable contract,
the reserved power was held to apply only to the contract
between the State and the corporation. 26
It is important to note that the immutable contract
theory was originated in the courts of the State of New
Jersey; however, the highest court in that State has
recently expressly refused to apply the theory so as to
prevent the application of a statutory power to donate
to a pre-existing corporation. 27 At any rate, the necessity of examining the scope of the state's reserved power
does not arise at all, unless the statutory power to donate
may be said to effect fundamental change in the corporate charter, as distinguished from a change which is
merely incidental, such as a change made pursuant to the
specific terms of the original "charter-contract". At the
outset it should be understood that if a fundamental
change in the charter of a Utah corporation is to be effective, unanimous consent of shareholders is required
regardless of whether the change is accomplished either
by means of a statutory amendment to the laws governing corporations or by means of an amendment by the
shareholders to the certificate of incorporation. As a
leading textwriter put it :28
25 Durfre v. Olil Colonu and Fall River Railroad Company &
Others, 87 Mass. 230 (1862).
26 7nhri.'lk?'e v. TT"'· Hnr-7te'J?Mr-k and New York Railroad Compam!. 18 N. J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867).
2 7 A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow. 26 N. J. S11pPr.
JOn ~7 A. 2d JR6 (1953). nff'd. 18 N . .T. ~ 14fl. 98 A. 2rl 581
(1953), appeal dismis~ed 346 U. S. Sol (1953). The A. P. Smith
case is hereinafter discussed at length.
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A change in fundamentals is an. amendment,
whether it is called such or not and whether made
by the legislature directly or by the corporation
itself by legislative authorization. A material and
fundamental change in the charter by an amendment to that charter is an unconstitutional violation of the contract rights of any shareholder who
does not consent to such an amendment.
That the statutory power to donate does not constitute a change in fundamentals, but represents a mere
incidental change in the appellant's charter may be
demonstrated from the fact that it could have been
engrafted on the appellant's charter by shareholder
amendment rather than by legislative amendment and
in such case unanimous consent of shareholders would
not have been required.
The Articles of Association of the appellant corporation contained the following provision at the time of its
incorporation, which provision has remained operative
to date :29
... It may also from time to time amend these
Articles of Association by filing amended Articles
of Association, increasing the capital stock, or
otherwise, agreeably with law. enlarging or changing the powers of the corporation hereby formed ...
(Emphasis supplied.)
In addition to the fact that the appellant's Articles
of Association specifically authorize additions to or
changes in the powers of the corporation, the Utah Corporation Code specifically authorizes shareholder amendments to the Articles by adding to the purposes of the
corporation by a mere majority vote in the absence of a
specific charter provision. (The appellant's .A.rticles are
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silent as to the vote required for a shareholders' amendment.)
The statute reads in part as follows :80
The articles of incorporation of any corporation now existing or that hereafter may be organized under the laws of this state may be amended
in any respect conformable to the laws of this state
in such manner and by the vote of such proportion
of all or any class or classes of stock as the articles
of incorporation may provide; and in case the articles of incorporation do not so provide, by a vote
representing at least a majority in amount of the
outstanding stock thereof entitled to vote at a
stockholders' meeting called for that purpose as
prescribed in section 16-2-49; provided, that, if all
the stockholders entitled to vote, vote in favor of
such amendment at any meeting of the stockholders, the notice required by section 16-2-49 need
not be given; and provided further, that the original purpose of the corporation shall not be altered
or changed without the approval and consent of all
the outstanding stock, but the adding to the purposes or object or extending the power and business of the corporation shall not be deemed a
chan.qe of the or·iginal purpose of the corporation
. . . (Emphasis supplied.)
The predecessor to this Section was construed by
this Court in Fowler et al. v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co. et al. 81 It was therein held that an amendment
empowering an irrigation corporation ''to purchase stock
in other corporations, to purchase dams, canals etc. and
to assess its own capital stock"32 was not a material and
fundamental change which altered the original purpose
Section 16-2-45, Utah Code Anno., 1953.
99 Utah 267 (1940), cert. denied 313 U. S. 564 (1941).
82 ld. at 272.
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of the corporation, and which would require unanimous
shareholder consent.
The holding was as follows :33
... Defendant corporation is engaged in the
business of supplying irrigating water to its stockholders. . .. The amendments which we are considering empower the corporation to acquire additional facilities for diverting and transmitting
irrigation water, to enter into contracts to acquire
water rights, to encumber its property to pay its
debts, to purchase stock in other corporations, to
purchase its own stock and to assess its own stock
for any and all corporate purposes. In other words,
the corporation is enabled by virtue of such amendments, to secure for distribution to its stockholders
irrigating water diverted into Provo River under
the Deer Creek Project. This change seems to be
not only consistent with the original corporate
purpose but a logical extension or growth which
might have been expected in the corporate activity.
We hold such amendments to be in conformity
with Section 18-2-44, R. S. U. 1933, which reads
in part:
' ... the adding to the purposes or object or
extending the power and business of the corporation shall not be deemed a change of the
original purpose of the corporation... '
That the water is diverted from another watershed into Provo River before it is withdrawn by
defendant is no basis for holding that the water
is not conveyed 'from Provo River to Provo Bench
and lands adjacent thereto.' To us it appears
tha.t said arnendrrtents do not fundamentally change
the purpose of the corporation, but rather, they
represent a natural and foreseeable development
of the business of the corporation in furtherance
of its purpose. As more land is cultivated and
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the demand for irrigating water increases, as
engineering science and study develop methods of
preserving more of the run-off of water in our
mountains and of transmitting and utilizing it for
irrigation, and as capital becomes available to
execute these projects, it is logical and proper that
the business of existing irrigation corporations be
expanded to secure and distribute the additional
water. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Salt Lake .Automobile Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co. et
al., 45 Utah 218 (1914) this Court rejected the claim by

dissenting holders of existing preferred stock in the
corporation that their Constitutional rights were invaded
by an amendment to the charter which was adopted by
a majority vote, pursuant to statutory authorization, and
which authorized the issuance of a new preferred stock
with preferential rights. The court did not hold the
amendment to represent a fundamental change in the
preferred shareholder's contract so as to give rise to an
invasion of such Constitutional right.
The appellant submits that under the provision of its
Articles of Association authorizing extensions of the
powers of the corporation, the specific language of the
Utah statutes authorizing shareholder amendments to
add to the purposes of the corporation, and the prior
determinations of this Court, the power to donate, which
has been added to the appellant's charter by legislative
amendment, could have been added thereto by shareholders' amendment without the necessity for unanimous
consent. The donative power, therefore, does not represent a "fundamental change" in the contracts of the
respondent shareholders so as to give substance to the
Constitutional objections_ which they have raised.
The testimony of the appellant's witnesses, as well
as the holdings of the New Jersey courts in .A. P. Smith
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Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, infra, which will hereinafter be discussed, evidence the fact that the donative
power is, under the tests laid down by this Court in
Fowler et al. v. Provo Bench Canal&; Irrigation Co. et al.,
supra, "a logical extension or growth" and a "natural
and foreseeable development'' in the powers of the
modern business corporation and of its social responsibilities. The appellant's witnesses, without exception,
supported expansion of its philanthropic activities as a
necessary concomitant to the proper conduct of its business as a common carrier, and nowhere in the cross examination, or otherwise, is there the slightest suggestion of
a change in the original purpose of the corporation.
(c) Even if the application to the appellant corpora·
tion of the statutory power to donate effects a fundamental change in the shareholders' contracts embodied
in the appellant's charter, the exercise of such power does
not constitute an impairment of the obligation of such
shareholders' contracts.

Even if it is assumed for purposes of the argument
that tlie application to the appellant corporation of the
statutory power to donate effects a fundamental change
in the shareholders' contracts embodied in the appellant's
charter, such application must be sustained as a valid
exercise of the State's reserved power. In the previous
section reference was made to the fact that United States
courts have adopted two views with respect to the scope
of the reserved power of a State. Under the Massachusetts rule of Du,rfee v. Old Colony and Fall River Railroad Contpany ct Others 84 it was held that the reserved
power must be broadly construed so as to validate what,
in the absence of such reserved power, would constitute
impairments of any of the contracts embodied in the corSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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porate charter, including the shareholder-corporate con~
tract. On the other hand under the theory of immutable
contract first announced by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Zabriskie v. The Hackensack and New York
Railroad C ompany35 the reserved power was narrowly
construed so as to apply merely to the state-corporate
charter contract and not the corporate-shareholder contract.
Under the so-called Massachusetts rule, with respect
to the broad scope of the state's reserved power, the
impairment of contract objection raised by the respondents must fail. It is to be noted that this Court in its
opinion in Cowan, et al. v. Salt Lake Hardware Co. 36 gave
recent recognition to the broad scope of the Utah reserved
power as pertaining not only to the corporate-state contract but also to the corporate-shareholder contract. The
Cowan case was an action by preferred stockholders to
determine the right of a corporation to amend its charter
so as to make non-callable preferred shares callable. The
shareholders contended that the charter did not contain
authority to amend and that the Constitutional and statutory provisions permitting amendments were merely
reservations of power protecting the relationship between
the state and the corporation, and to be exercised only in
matters of public concern and welfare. The court rejected
this contention, quoting the reserved power found in the
Utah Constitution, the statutory power to amend, and
then made the following statement :37
Counsel for appellants in their brief have provided this court with an interesting and learned
treatise on the historical background of the rea35

18 N. J. Eq. 178 ( Ch. 1867).

sa 118 Utah 300 ( 1950).
aT Id. at pp. 303-304.
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sons for the adoption by states of constitutional
and statutory provisions similar to ours quoted
above in order to avoid the effect of the ruling of
the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Trustees of D.artmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, wherein it was held that
the charter granted by a state to a corporation was
in the nature of a contract between the state and
the corporation, and that the state could not impair
its obligations, thereunder by subsequent legislation. How ever interesting this historical background is, it is now well settled that such
constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing
amendments of Articles of Incorporation do not
only pertain to the relationship between the state
and the corporation, but pertain to the rights
between the corporation and its stockholders.
(Emphasis supplied.)
So then, in arriving at its holding in Cowan, this
Court specifically regarded the broad construction of
the reserved power to be "well settled" law in Utah.
It is submitted that the holding requires the rejection by
this Court of the Constitutional objections raised by the
respondents herein. 38
Even if this Court were to examine such Constitutional objections in the light of a narrow construction
of the reserved power under the immutable contract
theory, it would be required to sustain the application
of the donative power legislation to the appellant. The
New Jersey Supreme Court, which itself gave :first recognition to the theory, has recently refused to apply it
so as to invalidate the application of the New Jersey
statutory power to donate to a pre-existing corporation.
88 See. Dvkstra, Utah CorporaNon Code, 4 Utah J.J. Rev. 439,
452-454 ( 1955).
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In A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow 89 the New
Jersey court passed upon the legality of a contribution
to a private university by a corporation which had been
organized prior to the passage of the permissive legislation. The court held that the advancement of the public
interest which would result from corporate giving justified the invoking of the reserved power so as to sustain
the legislation even though contractual rights of shareholders may have been affected. With respect to its
refusal to apply the immutable contract theory to the
case the court stated as follows at pp. 156-157:
The appellants contend that the foregoing New
Jersey statutes may not be applied to corporations
created before their passage. Fifty years before
the incorporation of The A. P. Smith Manufacturing Company our Legislature provided that every
corporate charter thereafter granted 'shall be
subject to alteration, suspension and repeal, in the
discretion of the legislature.' L. 1846, p. 16; R. S.
14:2-9. A similar reserved power was placed into
our State Constitution in 1875 (Art. IV, Sec. VII,
par. 11), and is found in our present Constitution.
Art. IV, Sec. VII, par. 9. In the early case of
Zabriskie v. Hackensack and New York Railroad
Company, 18 N. J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867), the court
was called upon to determine whether a railroad
could extend its line, above objection by a stockholder, under a legislative enactment passed upon
the reserve power after the incorporation of the
railroad. Notwithstanding the breadth of the
statutory language and persuasive authority elsewhere (Durfee v. Old Colony & Fall River Railroad Company, 87 Mass. 230 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1862) ),
it was held that the proposed extension of the
39 26 N.J. Super. 106, 97 A. 2d 186 (1953), aff'd, 13 N.J. 9e:
145,98 A. 2d 581 (1953), appeal dismissed 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
company's line constituted a vital change of its
corporate object which could not be accomplished
without unanimous consent. See Lattin, A Primer
on Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 West Res.
L. Rev. 3, 7 (1949). The court announced the now
familiar· New Jersey doctrine that although the
reserved power permits alterations in the public
interest of the contract between the state and the
corporation, it bas no effect on the contractual
rights between the corporation and its stockholders and between stockholders inter se. Unfortunately, the court did not consider whether it was
contrary to the public interest to permit the single
minority stockholder before it to restrain the railroad's normal corporate growth and development
as authorized by the Legislature and approved,
reasonably and in good faith, by the corporation's
managing directors and majority stockholders.
Although the later cases in New Jersey have not
disavowed the doctrine of the Zabriskie case, it is
noteworthy that they have repeatedly recognized
that where justified by the advancement of the
public interest the reserved power may be invoked
to sustain later charter alterations eren though
they affect contractual rights between the corporation and its stockholders and between stockholders
inter se. (Emphasis supplied.)
The court then went on to sustain the validity of the
donation in the following language at pp. 160-161:
It seems clear to us that the public policy supporting the statutory enactments under consideration is far greater and the alteration of pre-existing
rights of stockholders much lesser than in the cited
cases sustaining various exercises of the reserve
power. In encouraging and expressly authorizing
reasonable charitable contributions by corporations, our State has not only joined with other
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states in advancing the national interest but has
also specially furthered the interests of its own
people who must bear the burden of taxation
resulting from increased state and federal aid
upon default in voluntary giving. It is significant
that in its enactments the State has not in anywise
sought to impose any compulsory obligations or
alter the corporate objectives. And since in our
view the corporate power to make reasonable charitable contributions exists under modern conditions, even apart from express statutory provision,
its enactments simply constitute helpful and confirmatory declarations of such power, accompanied
by limiting safeguards.
In the light of all of the foregoing we have no
hesitancy in sustaining the validity of the donation by the plaintiff. There is no suggestion that
it was made indiscriminately or to a pet charity of
the corporate directors in furtherance of personal
rather than corporate ends. On the contrary, it
was made to a preeminent institution of higher
learning, was modest in amount and well within
the limitations imposed by the statutory enactments, and was voluntarily made in the reasonable
belief that it would aid the public welfare and
advance the interests of the plaintiff as a private
corporation and as part of the community in which
it operates. We find that it was a lawful exercise
of the corporation's implied and incidental powers
under common-law principles and that it came
within the express authority of the pertinent state
legislation. As has been indicated, there is now
widespread belief throughout the nation that free
and vigorous non-governmental institutions of
learning are vital to our democracy and the system
of free enterprise and that withdrawal of corporate authority to make such contributions within
reasonable limits would seriously threaten their
continuance. Corporations have come to recognize
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this and with their enlightenment have sought in
varying measures, as has the plaintiff by its contribution, to insure and strengthen the society
which gives them existence and the means of aiding themselves and their fellow citizens. Clearly
then, the appellants, as individual stockholders
whose private interests rest entirely upon the wellbeing of the plaintiff corporation, ought not be
permitted to close their eyes to present-day realities and thwart the long-visioned corporate action
in recognizing and voluntarily discharging its high
obligations as a constituent of our modern social
structure.
Fifty years ago in Garey v. 1llining Co. 40 this Court
was called upon to construe the scope of the State's
reserved power and seemed at that time to favor the
immutable contract theory. In Garey the action was
instituted by dissenting stockholders, who objected to an
amendment to the charter, which had been approved by
1najority vote in accordance with statutory authority and
which made nonassessable full paid stock assessable and
subject to sale. This Court held the statutory authorization to constitute an impairment of the obligation of contract, quoting from the New Jersey Zabriskie case,
supra. 41 However, the case is to be distinguished from
the case at bar by two important facts. In Garey, this
Court, in the following lang·uage, held that the action
complained of did not relate in any way to the contract
between the state and the corporation, and did not purport to be for the benefit of the public : 4 ~
32 Utah 497 (1907).
Zabrislde v. The Ha.ckensack and .Sew rork Rail1·oad Company, 18 N.J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867).
42 See, Note 40 supra at p. 513.
40

41

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
Bearing in mind that the corporate charter is a
dual contract-one between the state and the corporation and its stockholders, the other between
the corporation and its stockholders-and that
under t4e reserved power the state may alter or
amend the former, but not the latter, the question
is: Under which do the legislative enactment of
1903 and the action taken by the majority of the
stockholders falU We are of the opinion that they
do not pertain to any right, privilege, or immunity
which the state had granted to the corporation or
to its stockholders, and that the action by such
stockholders in no wise affected or was related to
the contract existing between the state and the
corporation. It merely pertains to and affects the
contract existing among the stockholders themselves. Neither the enactment nor the stockholders' amendment of the articles purport to be
for the benefit of the creditors or for the benefit of
the public. Thereunder no right or privilege in
favor of creditors or the public is created, and
thereunder no creditor could assert any right or
claim that could not have been asserted by him
prior to the enactment.
Moreover, the opinion distinguished cases, where statutes enacted under the reserved power and imposing
individual liability on incorporators for corporate debts
had been sustained, on the grounds that such statutes
pertained ''directly to the very franchise and immunity
granted by the state, and directly relates to and affects
the contract between the state and the corporation and
its stockholders". 43
In the case at bar the statutory power to donate
similarly relates to and affects the corporation-state contract. That the statute was enacted by the legislature
43

I d. at p. 515.
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in furtherance of the public interest is beyond dispute
and has been amply demonstrated.
At any rate, as hereinabove noted, New Jersey, the
state which originated the doctrine of immutable contract, has held it to be inapplicable where a statutory
power to engage in corporate philanthropy is involved.
An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court
from the New Jersey Supreme Court's determination in
A. P. Smith, however the appeal was dismissed for the
"want of a substantial federal question". 44
The United States Supreme Court has consistently
upheld legislative amendments to corporate charters
enacted in exercise of the reserved power over objections
on the grounds of impairment of the obligation of the
charter contract even where the interests of stockholders
were more substantially affected than they are under the
granting of a statutory power to donate. The changes
effected by the statutes which have been reviewed by
the Court included changed voting rights,45 repeal of the
cLarter/ 6 a change in the business from cooperative and
assessment life insurance to life insurance of every
kind, 47 a change in the liability of bank stockholders48
and a change in the withdrawal rights of stockholders in
a building and loan association. 49
The statutory power to donate was enacted by the
Utah Legislature in order to encourag·e corporate giving
by removing all doubt with respect to its legality and
through such encouragement to promote the general
346 u. s. 861 (1953).
Miller v. The State, 15 Wall. 478 (U. S., 1872) and Looker
v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900).
46
Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13 (1881).
47
Polk v. Mutual Reserve F'u.nd, 207 U. S. 310 (1907).
48
Stockholders v. Sterling, 300 U. S. 175 (1937).
49
Veiz v. Sixth Ward Assn., 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
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welfare of citizens of the state. It is the appellants'
position that for this reason the statutory power to
donate may be sustained, independent of the reserved
power, as a valid exercise of the state's police power.
In the A. P. Smith case the lower court specifically held
that t:ue legislation could be sustained solely as an exercise of the State's police power :50
Finally, the legislation challenged in this case
is clearly sustainable under the police power
reserved to and residing in each State. 'The
police power of a state is an inherent attribute
of its sovereignty with which it is endowed for the
protection and general welfare of its citizens, and
of which the state may not divest itself by contracts or otherwise.'

•

•

•

•

•

Every person joining a chartered corporate
enterprise does so subject to the paramount police
power of the State. 'All contracts, whether made
by the state itself, by municipal corporations, or
by individuals, are subject to be interfered with,
or otherwise affected by, subsequent statutes
enacted in the bona fide exercise of the police
power, and do not, by reason of the contracts
clause of the constitution, enjoy any immunity
from such legislation'....
50 A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 26 N. J. Super.
106, 122 (1953) ; see also St. Louis, Iron Mounta1:n & Railway v.
Paul, 173 U. S. 404 (1899); Erie RR Co. v. Wilriams, 233 U. S.
685 (1914); Sutton v. New Jersey, 244 U. S. 258 (1917) and
Home Building & L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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(d) The statutory grant to Utah corporations of the
power to make donations does not violate the Due Process
clauses of the Constitution of the United States or of the
Utah Constitution.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides, among other
·things:
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;.
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution contains a
similar prohibition. Since the .statute in question does
no more than grant permission to corporations to make
charitable gifts, it cannot be argued that the Legislature,
in enacting it, has deprived any person of any property.
Presumably the due process argument must therefore
rest on the contention that the statute amends the corporate contract and that such amendment of itself
deprives the shareholders of a property right. In this
guise the argument is nothing more than a reiteration of
the argument that the statute violates the Constitutional
prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts.
Courts have long recognized that Constitutional objections to statutory alteration of corporate charters are
one and the same whether framed under the Contracts
Clause or under the Due Process Clause. Thus in Polk v.
The Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association of New
York51 a statute of the State of New York was attacked
before the United States Supreme Court under both of
said clauses. The statute in question resembled the statute here involved in that it granted additional corporate
powers, not permitted when the original chart~rs were
207

u.s. 310

(1907).

Ill
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granted. The statute permitted mutual life insurance
associations to reincorporate under new charters granting
power to engage in various types of insurance business
not previously permitted to such companies. The plaintiffs, who had become members and policy holders under
the old charter, brought an action for dissolution of the
company claiming that reincorporation pursuant to the
statutory permission violated their Constitutional rights
under the Contracts Clause and under the Due Process
Clause. After holding that the statute did not impair the
contractual rights of the plaintiffs, the Court said :52
The other two questions certified inquire
whether the law under which the reincorporation
was made, or the reincorporation and changes in
power made under its provisions, are in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. These questions do not
require separate or detailed consideration. As
applied to the facts of this case, they are practically dealt with in the discussion which has preceded. It is not suggested that any rights secured
to the complainants by the Fourteenth Amendment were violated in any other manner than by
the reincorporation of the Association without the
consent of its members, the change in and addition to its powers, and the consequent effect upon
the contract rights of the complainants and upon
their relation to the corporation. But it has been
shown that the contract rights of the complainant
have not been affected by the reincorporation, and
the same reasoning that leads to the conclusion
that the changes in the charter powers, made under
the reserved powers of the State, do not violate
the contract clause of the Constitution are apt to
show that they do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
52

Id. at p. 327.
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Likewise in V eix v. Sixth Ward Building and Loan
Association of N ewark 53 the United States Supreme
Court sustained a statutory alteration of corporate rights
against the contention that the statute violated the
Contracts Clause and then disposed of due process objections in a summary fashion. In that case the Legislature
of New Jersey had passed a statute altering the withdrawal rights of building and loan association certificate
holders. A person who had become a certificate holder
prior to the statutory change claimed Constitutional protection for his withdrawal rights as they existed prior to
the passage of the statute. The court sustained the statute as a proper and reasonable exercise of the State's
police power, analogous to the reserved power to amend
corporate charters. It stated that the statute involved no
impairment of the obligation of contracts and that separate consideration of the objection under the Due
Process Clause was "wholly unnecessary". 54
In Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell55
the United States Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota
mortgage moratorium law against a contention that the
statute constituted an impairment of the obligation of
contracts and violated due process of law. The court in
that case did not even find it necessary to discuss the Due
Process Clause, contenting itself with stating that what
was said in the opinion concerning the Contracts Clause
"is also applicable to the contention presented under the
Due Process Clause.' '56
The inherent police power of the state to act with
respect to matters concerning the welfare, including
310 u. s. 32 (1940).
I d. at p. 41.
55 290 u. s. 398 (1933).
MId. at p. 448.

58
54
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specifically the economic and social welfare, of its citizens
and institutions, has always been recognized. When
measured against the requirements of due process, the
will of the Legislature is generally upheld where the
enactment is not arbitrary and is a reasonable response
to the exigencies of the given situation. The United
States Supreme Court has consistently upheld state
legislation affecting corporations even though such legislation substantially altered corporate property rights.
Thus, a statutory requirement that railroads pay their
employees at least semi-monthly and in cash was held not
a deprivation of property without duo process of law. 157
A requirement that New Jersey street railway companies
furnish free transportation to police officers on duty was
held not a deprivation of due process.158 And a requirement
that discharged employees be paid up to date with a per
diem penalty for failure to do so was held not a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 159 Finally, in A. P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, supra, state legislation
closely paralleling the Utah legislation was held to be
free from attack on Constitutional grounds.
In adding to the powers of Utah corporations, the
State Legislature has very wisely responded to a felt
public need for corporate support of eleemosynary activities. The record in this case demonstrates that private
eleemosynary institutions in the United States, including
those in the State of Utah, can no longer operate effectively and indeed may be in danger of complete collapse
unless supported financially by corporate giving. The
private resources of charitably minded individuals are,
Erie RR Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685 (1914).
css Sutton v. New Jersey, 244 U. S. 258 (1917).
15 9 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Railway v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404
(1899).
15 7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42
under current taxation, no longer sufficient for the purpose. These were the circumstances under which the
Legislature of Utah passed the enabling legislation here
in question. To state that this well-considered and timely
legislation infringes Constitutional guarantees is to look
backward instead of forward and to substitute a narrow
legalism for a broad gauge legislative policy. In determining whether the Legislature of Utah has violated the
State and Federal Constitutions, it is not the function of
this Court to substitute its judgment of what is good for
the public welfare for that of the elected legislators. The
legislative exercise must be upheld unless it is so arbitrary, capricious or lacking in judgment as to constitute
a basic interference with the compact between state and
people. This is obviously not so in the case at bar.

I I
The contribution represents a valid exercise by
the appellant corporation of an implied corporate
power.
In Zion's Savings Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Tropic & East Fork
lrr. Co. 60 this Court held that Article XII, Section 10 of
the Utah Constitution, which provides that "No corporation shall engage in any business other than that
expressly authorized in its charter or articles of incorporation", requires that a strict interpretation be given
to the Articles of Incorporation. However, this Court
has aJ Ro long recognized the existence of in1plied corporate powers. In the Zion's Savings case, this Court
quoted its dictum in Tracy Loan and Trust Co. v. liferchants Bank,61 wherein it was stated that:
ao 102 Utah 101 (1942).
61

50 Utah 196, 202-203 (1917).
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Implied powers of a bank or of any corporation
for that matter are those incidental to and connected with the carrying into effect or the accomplishing of the general purposes of the corporation
as expressed in the object clauses of its Articles.
In Hadlock, State Bank Commissioner v. Callister, 62
this Court stated that "a corporation may be said to
possess such implied powers as are necessary, usual or
incidental to its business". 63 The necessity for the exercise of implied or incidental powers was foreseen in 1897,
by the framers of the original Articles of Association of
the appellant corporation, as evidenced by the following language of Article 8 :64
... in exercising its corporate powers (the corporation) may do such acts as the directors may deem
necessary or expedient not inconsistent with these
Articles or with the Constitution and laws of the
State of Utah.
One of the prime duties of the board of directors of any
corporation is, of course, to preserve, maintain, and, to the
extent dictated by the requirements of the business, add to
the corporate business property. It is no less the duty of
any board of directors to preserve the existence of the corporation itself. The testimony of each of the directors
who testified in the appellants' behalf clearly indicates
that each deems it "necessary or expedient" to embark
on the program in issue in this case. This was succinctly
stated, with respect to educational grants, by Mr.
Mullendore :61i
62

85 Utah 510,518 (1935).
I d. at p. 518.
64 Article 8 of Appellants' Articles of Association, R. following p. 26.
fiG Mullendore Dep., p. 7.
63
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... we feel that it is just as much the obligation of
the corporate management to use some of its
resources in helping to educate the youth of a country and of our community in the principles and
traditions of our free institutions, as it is to use
our resources in the construction and maintenance
of our physical equipment....
With respect to charitable contributions in the communities served by plaintiff corporation, Mr. Harriman
testified that :66
. . . If the communities were not there, we certainly would not be able to serve them, and in a like
manner, if they are not in a good condition, mentally, morally and physically, they would not be as
good customers. We really believe the existence of
this atmosphere of healthy environment I speak of,
is as much of a must in the maintenance of it by our
company as the maintenance of our physical property, using reasonable judgment throughout.
It is under the principle of implied powers that the
corporate power to engage in philanthropic activities was
first recognized by an English court. In Hutton v. West
Cork Railway Company, 61 Lord Justice Bowen by way
of dictum made the following statement, which has since
become a classic in the early common law on corporate
donations:
It seems to me you cannot say the company has
only got power to spend the money which it is bound
to pay according to law, otherwise the wheels of
business would stop, nor can you say that directors
... are always to be limited to the strictest possible
view of what the obligations of the company are.
Tbey are not to keep their pockets buttoned up and
66

R. 60.
23
Ch. D. 654, 672 ( 1883).
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defy the world unless they are liable in a way which
could be enforced at law or in equity. Most businesses require liberal dealings. The test there
again is not whether it is bona fide, but whether, as
well as being done bona fide, it is done within the
ordinary scope of the company's business, and
whether it is reasonably incidental to the carrying
on of the company's business for the company's
benefit.
The dictum of the Hutton case then, justified corporate
charity on the grounds of implied authority where the act
performed was within the ordinary .scope of company
business and a company benefit was reasonably incident
thereto. This theory, long known as the direct benefit
test, has during the twentieth century been progressively relaxed. .At first, questions were raised about
corporate pension plans 68 and other matters involving
employee relations, such as relief funds, 69 hospital
funds, 70 medical care, 71 health plans 72 and disability
plans. 73 However in each such case the action of the
corporation was sustained and it has now become accepted
that such matters are within the implied powers of the
corporation. Further expansion of the doctrine of corporate benefit is found in cases holding that where a corporation must rely on a particular university for its
68
Heinz v. National Bank of Commerce, 237 Fed. 942 (8th
Cir., 1916) and Nemser v. Aviation Corporation, 47 F. Supp. 515
(D. Del., 1942).
69
Beck v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 63 N.J. L. 232 (1899).
7
Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F. 2d 798 (App. D. C.,
1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 742 (1930) and People ex rel.
Metropol?'tan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 150 (3rd
Dept., 1909).
71 Bedford Belt Railway Company v. McDonald, 17 Ind. App.
492 (1897).
..
72
State v. Railway Co., 68 Ohio St. 9 (1903).
78 McAdow v. Railway Co., 96 Kan. 423 (1915).

°
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employees, it is within the power of the corporation to
contribute to that university. 74
In .A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, supra,
the power to make contributions was also sustained, apart
from the statute, on common law principles. It was held
that corporate contributions in support of academic institutions were, in the terms of the early common law rule,
for the "benefit" of the corporation. Moreover, a new
common law rationale was advanced to validate the donation, i. e., that of "corporate social responsibility".
In the .A. P. Smith trial, there was testimony by the
President of the Company, by Frank W. Abrams, Chairman of the Board of the Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey, and Irving S. Olds, former Chairman of the
Board of the United States Steel Corporation, all to the
effect that free enterprise owes its survival in some degree
to the existence of private, independent universities and
that corporations further their own self-interest in contributing to liberal arts institutions by assuring a supply of properly trained personnel for administrative and
other corporate employment. }.Ir. Abrams testified that
corporations are expected to acknowledge their responsibilities in support of the essential elements of a free
enterprise system, and that it was not "good !>usiness"
to disappoint ''this reasonable and justified public expectation". He further stated that it was not right for
corporations ''to take substantial benefits from their
membership in the economic community while avoiding
the normally accepted obligations of citizenship in the
social community''.TG
The Supreme Court of New Jersey called attention to
the fact, amply demonstrated in the record before this
74
Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., 285 Fed. 58
(D. C. W. D., N. Y., 1922).
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Court, that individuals were able to donate freely for
charitable purposes during the years when individual
tax rates were much lower than at present but, with the
transfer of wealth to corporate hands, and the increasingly heavy burden of individual taxation, individuals
have more and more turned to corporations to '' . . .
assume the modern obligations of good citizenship in
the same manner as humans do''. 76 The court had no difficulty in finding that the common law could and should
expand to justify corporate contributions and made the
following pronouncement in upholding the contribution
under common law principles :77
It seems to us that just as the conditions prevailing when corporations were originally created
required that they serve public as well as private
interests, modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as
private responsibilities as members of the communities within which they operate. Within this
broad concept there is no difficulty in sustaining,
as incidental to their proper objects and in aid
of the public welfare, the power of corporations
to contribute corporate funds within reasonable
limits in support of academic institutions. But
even if we confine ourselves to the terms of the
common law rule in its application to current conditions, such expenditures may likewise readily be
justified as being for the benefit of the corporation;
indeed, if need be the matter may be viewed
strictly in terms of actual survival of the corporation in a free enterprise system. The genius of
our common law has been its capacity for growth
and its adaptability to the needs of the times. Generally courts have accomplished the desired result
indirectly through the molding of old forms. OccaId. at p. 153 (586).
11 Id. at p. 154 (586).
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sionally they have done it directly through frank
rejection of the old and recognition of the new. But
whichever path the common law has taken it has
not been found wanting as the proper tool for the
advancement of the general good.
The evidence, contained in the record, reveals that
the purpose of the appellant's Board of Directors, in making the contribution involved in this case, or in making
contributions for the public welfare or for charitable,
scientific, religious or educational purposes, is to enable
the corporation and its stockholders to benefit from the
favorable economic and social results flowing from such
action and to assume its rightful share of the responsibilities of corporate citizenship in the community. The contribution thus represents a valid exercise, of a judicially
well recognized implied corporate power. Moreover, the
evidence indicates the extent to which the Directors of
other corporations in the United States have reached
similar conclusions and engaged in corporate giving. The
record demonstrates the marked upward trend in corporate donations since 1940, as well as the average annual
donation per corporation in terms of percentage of net
incon1e before taxes. 78 This growth in corporate donations, resulting in an estimated total for the year 1956
of approximately $500 million, of which $100 million went
to support higher education, has recently been described
as being of ''revolutionary proportions'' and yet inadequate when measured against educational needs. 79 The
trend is further reflected by the latest statistics from the
Internal Revenue Service according to which corpora78
70
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tions in the year 1953 gave 1.24% of their net income
before taxes to philanthropy. 80
The passage by the Utah Legislature of the donative
power statute is, of course, no indication that the power
to make the contribution in issue cannot be sustained on
common law grounds. The purpose of the Legislature
in passing the statute was to confirm the corporate power
to donate in broad terms so as to obviate the slow and
painful process of individual adjudications, the alternate method of developing the law governing corporate
giving, which is not only productive of uncertainty but
is a burden on the courts and litigants. The task of looking to the decisional law for precedent is a difficult
one because of the paucity of cases and the several factors considered by the courts in resolving each suit, viz.:
the type of corporation, the nature of its business, the
nature of the charity, the proposed use to which the funds
will be appropriated and the relation of such use to the
nature of the donor's business. The absence of clearcut statutory authority presents a corporation with a
choice of either declining to discharge its responsibilities
and failing to gain the benefits from corporate giving
or engaging in donative activities at the risk of expensive
litigation. These are the factors which motivate a legislature to enact the statutory power to donate.
Under the applicable decisions and the evidence submitted herein, the implied power of the appellant corporation to make the contribution in issue must be sustained
on common law grounds as an implied corporate power
to be exercised for the benefit of the corporation and in
discharge of its corporate social responsibilities.
80 Statistics of Income for 1953, Pt. 2, Preliminary Report,
pp. 6-11 (U. S. Treasury Dept., Washington, D. C.).
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The fact that the appellant is a Utah railroad corporation does not distinguish it from any other corporation
with respect to its power to make donations. The issue
of whether the contribution in question, or similar contributions, may be charged to operating expense, with
some consequent effect upon the users of the appellant's
rail service, is irrelevant to the controversy before this
Court, and a question to be decided by the many other
tribunals having jurisdiction over rates. 81 The sole issues
here are whether the corporation possesses the power to
make the contribution involved in this case, and other
contributions for the public welfare, or for charitable,
scientific, religious or educational purposes.
CONCLUSION

The declaratory judgment in favor of the defendantsrespondents entered in the District Court upon written
findings of fact and conclusions of law should be reversed
and declaratory judgment should be entered in favor of
the plaintiff-appellant as prayed for in the complaint.
Respectfully submitted,

F. E.

BARNETT,

W. R. RousE,
CoYIXGTON HARDEE,
BRYAN

P. LEVERICH,

~L

BRONSON,

J.

WILLIAM J.

McDoNALD, JR~,

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, Union
Pacific Railroad Company,
10 South l\Iain Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
81

See, Accounting of N. Y. Telepk. Go., 188 I. C. C. 83 (1932)
concerning the right of N. Y. Telephone Co. to charge a chari·
table donation to operating expense.
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APPENDIX A
LEGISLATION CONFIRMING THE
POWER OF CORPORATIONS TO
ENGAGE IN PHILANTHROPY•

.Arkansas
Acts 1951, No. 69; Ark. Stat. 1947, 64-112 (Supp.).

California
Stats. 1949, C. 997; Cal. Gen. Corp. Code, Sec. 802(g)
(Deering).

Colorado
Laws 1947, C. 161; Colo. Rev. Stat. 1953, Sec. 31-1-28.

Connecticut
L. 1953, Act 56; Conn. Gen. Stat. 1536 amended by
1955 Supp. Sec. 2570d.

Delaware
Laws 1941, C. 132, as amended by Laws 1951, S. 397;
8 Del. Code 1953, Sec. 122.

District of Columbia
Pub. L. No. 389, Sec. 4(m), 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(effective December 6, 1954). D. C. Code Ann. 1951, Sec.
29-904 (Supp.).

Florida
Laws of 1955, C. 29886, Sees. 5-7; Fla. Stat. 1951, Sec.
608.13.

Georgia
Laws 1953, No. 620, p. 121; Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 22-728
(1955 Supp.).
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Hawaii

Laws of 1947, Act 104, Hawaii Rev. L. Sec. 8340.01.
Illinois

Laws 1919, p. 312, reenacted by Laws 1933, p. 310,
amended by Laws 1949, p. 605; amended by L. 1955, p.
1421; Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1957, C. 32, Sec. 157.5.
Indiana

Acts 1949, C. 194; Burns Ind. Ann. Stat. 1933, 25-11b
(1957 Supp.).
Kansas

Laws 1951, C. 214, Sec.1; Kan. Gen. Stat. Sec.17-3009
(1955 Supp.).
Kentucky

Acts 1952, C. 94, Sec. 1; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1953, Sec.
271.125(13).
Louisiana
Laws of 1954, Act 638; 3 La. Rev. Stat. Sec. 9 :2271.1.
Maine
R. S. 1951, Sec. 15, C. 4; Me. Rev. Stat. 1954, Ch. 53,
Sec. 16.
Maryland
Acts 1945, C. 1018 as amended by Acts 1951, C. 135;
Flack's Md. Code Ann. 1951, Revised Art. 23, Sec. 9.
Massachusetts
Laws of 1953, C. 415; Mass. Gen. Stat. Ann. C. 155,
Sec. 12c (1956 Supp.).
Michigan
Pub. Acts 1953, Act No. 156; Mich. Stat. Ann. Sec.
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Minnesota
.Session Laws 1949, C. 156; Minn. Rev. Stat. 1953,
Sec. 300.66, (1956 Supp.).

Mississippi
- Laws 1952, C. 227; Miss. Code Ann. 1942, recompiled,
Sec. 5325.7.

Missouri
Laws :Mo. 1937, p. 204 as amended by Laws
p. 696; Vernon's M~o. Stat. Ann. Sec. 351.385.

~io.

1945,

Nebraska
Laws)953, L. B. 159; R. R. S. 1943, Sec. 28-1401.

Nevada
Laws of 1953, 0.160;·Nev. Rev. Stat.1957, Sec. 78.070.

New Hampshire
Laws 1953, C. 71; R. S. Ann. 1955, Sec. 294.4.

New Jersey
Laws 1930, C. 105 as amended Laws 1931, C. 190,
reenacted by Laws 1949, C. 171; N. J. S. A. Sec. 14:3-13
and Laws 1950, C. 220; N. J. S. A. Sees. 14:3-13.1,
14:3-13.2, 14:3-13.3, 14:3-13.4.

New Mexico
Laws 1951, C. 105; N. M. Stat. Ann. 1953, Sec. 51-2-2.

New York
Laws 1941, C. 343 as amended by Laws 1951, C. 7,
C. 388; N. Y. General Corp. Law, Sec. 34 and Laws 1946,
C. 448, N.Y. General Corp. Law, Sec. 35.
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North Carolina
Session .Laws 1945, C. 775-; L. 1951, C. 1240; N. C.
Gen. Stat. 1943, Sec. 55-26.12.
Ohio
108 0. L. 1245 as amended by 112 0. L. 52 and 121

0. L. 70; Page's Ohio Rev. Gen. Code 1953, Sec. 1701.13.
Oklahoma
Session Laws 1949, p. 114; 18 Okla. Stat. Ann. 1951,
Sec. 1.19.
Oregon
Laws 1953, 0. 549; Ore. Rev. Stat. 1953, Sec. 57.030.
Pennsylvania
Act of 1945, P. L. 605 as amended by Act of 1947,
P. L. 290; 15 P. S. 2852-302(16) (1956 Supp.) and Act of
1945, P. L. 594 as amended by Act of 1947, P. L. 288;
15 P. S. 716 (1956 Supp.).
Rhode Island
P. L. 1952, C. 2919, Sec. 2.
Tennessee
Pub. Acts 1925, C. 59 as amended by Pub. Acts 1943,
C. 88; Tenn. Code Ann. 1956, Sec. 48-705.
Texas
Laws of 1955, C. 64; Tex. Bus. Corp. Act 1955, Art.
2.02.
Utah
L.1955, Ch. 22, p. 39, Sec.16-2-14(8), Utah Code Anno.
(Pk. Pt. 1957).
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Vermont
Acts 1953) H. B. 82 as amended by L. 1955, Act 81,
Sec. 1.

Virginia
Acts of Assembly 1954, C. 188 as amended by L. 1956,
C. 428; Va. Stock Corp. L. 1956, Sec. 13.1-3.

Washington
Laws 1953, C. 213, Sec. 1-3; Wash. Rev. Code, Sec.
23.46.010.

West Virginia
Acts 1949, H. B. 209; W. Va. Code 1949, Sec. 3015 (3).

Wisconsin
Laws 1951, C. 731; Wise. Stat. 1953, Sec. 180.04.
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APPENDIX B

September 1, 1950
MEMORANDUM FROM THE COMMITTEE ON
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS OF THE SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND
BUSINESS LAW OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION.

Re: Corporate Donations to Charity

Under date of 1farch 1, 1949, the Committee recommended that business corporations be empowered by
statute to make charitable donations without regard to
direct corporate benefit and without limitation as to
amount. The Committee suggested that the following
simple form be used in statutes that enumerate the general powers of corporation:
'' ( ) To make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational
purposes.''
and that the same form be used as a basis for a new
section consistent with the style of other statutes that
do not enumerate the general powers in a single section.
At that time donations by business corporations, for
various purposes and subject to varying limitations,
were authorized by statutes in the States of Colorado,
Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and 'Virginia, in the
Territory of Hawaii, and in the National Banking Act.
Subsequently statutes of similar import were enacted by
the States of California, Indiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma
and West Virginia.
It is the view of the C'Ommittee that the current corporate practice of making donations to charitable, scientific
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and educational institutions and for the public welfare
is supported by public opinion and seldom questioned by
stockholders. It is also the view of the Committee that
a statutory grant of power to legalize the practice should
be broad in its terms, that the exercise of the power
should be left to the discretion of corporate management,
and that there is no logical reason for prescribing a statutory yardstick for measuring the amount that can be
donated.
The Committee therefore renews its recommendation,
especially for consideration at the next sessions of the
legislatures in those States that have not yet given statutory recognition to the subject.
RAY GARRETT, Chairman.............
RICHARD F. BABCOCK, Secretary..
GmBONS BuRKE..............................
WHITNEY CAMPBELL......................
PAuL CARRINGTON..................... "···
JoHN SHAW FIELD........................
JoHN A. MoRRISON........................
WILLIAM H. NIEMAN.....................
KuRT F. PANTZER..........................
FRANCIS T. P. PLIMPTON..............
WILLARD P. ScoTT .........................
GEORGE C. SEWARD........................
GREENBERRY SIMMONS..................
CHARLES W. STEADMAN................

(Chicago, Illinois)
(Chicago, Illinois)
(New Orleans, Louisiana)
(Chicago, Illinois)
(Dallas, Texas)
(Reno, Nevada)
(Kansas City, Missouri)
(Cincinnati, Ohio)
(Indianapolis, Indiana)
(New York, New York)
(New York, New York)
(New York, New York)
(Louisville, Kentucky)
(Cleveland, Ohio)
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